Introduction
We present an efficient interactive identification scheme and a related signature scheme that are based on discrete logarithms and which are particularly suited for smart cards. Previous cryptoschemes, based on the discrete logarithm, have been proposed by El Gamal (1985) , Chaum, Evertse, Graaf (1988) , Beth (1988) and Gunter (1989) . The new scheme comprises the following novel features.
(1) We propose an efficient algorithm to preprocess the exponentiation of random numbers.
This preprocessing makes signature generation very fast. It also improves the efficiency of the other discrete log-cryptosystems. The preprocessing algorithm is based on two fundamental principles local randomization and internal randomization. (2) We use a prime modulus p such that p-l has a prime factor q of appropriate size (e.g. 140 bits long) and we use a base a for the discrete logarithm such that a' = 1 (mod p). All logarithms are calculated modulo q. The length of signatures is about 212 bits, i.e. it is less than half the length of RSA and Fiat-Shamir signatures.
The number of communication bits of the identification scheme is less than half that of other schemes.
The new scheme minimizes the work to be done by the smart card for generating a signature or for proving its identity. This is important since the power of current processors for smart cards is rather limited. Previous signature schemes require many modular multiplications for signature generation.
In the new scheme signature generation costs about 12 modular multiplications, and these multiplications do not depend on the message/identification, i.e. they can be done in preprocessing mode during the idle time of the processor.
The security of the scheme relies on the one-way property of the exponentiation y c-c CZ' (mod p), i.e. we assume that discrete logarithms with Q european patent application 89103290.6 from 24.2.1969 240 base Q are difficult to compute. The security of the preprocessing is established by information theoretic arguments.
This abstract is organised as follows. We present in section 2 a version of the signature scheme that uses exponentiation of a random integer. In section 3 we propose a n efficient algorithm that simulates this exponentiation. We study its security in section 4. The performance of the scheme is exemplified in section 5.
2. The identification and signature scheme Notation. For n E H let Z , be the ring of integers modulo n. We The KAC publishes p,q,a,h and its public key.
COMMENTS. The KAC's own keys are used for signing the public keys issued by the KAC. The KAC can use f o r its own signatures any public key signature scheme, e.g. RSA, Fiat-Shamir, Rabin or the new scheme presented here. The hash function h is only used for signatures and is not needed for identification. The function h outputs random numbers in (0,...,2t-l]; for the choice of the function h see the end of section 2. The security number t can depend on the application intended, we consider t P 72. The scheme is designed such that forging a signature or a n identification requires, with t = 72, about 2 7a steps.
Registration of users. When a user comes to the KAC for registration the KAC verifies its identity, generates an identification string I (containing name, address, ID-number etc.) and signs the pair (1,v) consisting of I and the user's public key v. The user can generate himself his private key s a n d the corresponding public key v.
The user's private and public key. Every user has a private key s which is a random number in {1,2, ...,q). The corresponding public key v is the number v = Q (mod p).
-I
Once the private key s has been chosen one can easily compute the corresponding public key v. The inverse process, to compute s from v, requires to compute the discrete logarithm with base Q of v-*, i.e. s -log, v
The following protocol is related to protocol 1 in Chaum, Evertse, Graaf (1988) ; it condenses this protocol to a single round. A fraudulent A can cheat by guessing the correct e and sending the crooked proof The probability of success for this attack is 2-t. By the following proposition this success rate cannot be increased unless computing log,v is easy. Proof. This is similar to Theorem 5 in Feige, Fiat, Shamir (1987) . The following algorithm AL' computes log,v. 1. Repeat the following steps at most 1/& times: generate x the same way as does algorithm AL, pick a random e' in (0, ..., 2 -1) and check whether A L passes the identification test f o r (x,e'); if A L succeeds then fix x and go to 2.
2. Probe 1 /~ random numbers en in (0,...,2t-1) . If algorithm A L passes the identification test f o r some en that is distinct from e' then go to 3 and otherwise stop. 3. Choose the numbers y', y" which A L submits to the identification test in response to e', e". (y'-y" is the discrete logarithm of v " -~' (mod P).) 4. Output (y'-y")/(e"-e') (mod q) .
t
We bound from below the success probability of this algorithm. The algorithm finds i n step 1 a passing pair (x,e') with probability a t least i. With probability a t least a, the x chosen in step 1, has the property that AL withstands the identification test for at least a ' $ s-fraction of all e E (0, ..., 2 -1). For such a n x step 2 finds a passing number en that is distinct from e' with probability a t least
This shows that the success probability of the algorithm is at least 0.3/4.
The verifier B is free to choose the bit string e in step 3 of the identification protocol, thus he can try to choose e in order to obtain useful information from A. The informal (but non rigorous) reason that A reveals no information is that the numbers x and y are random. The random number x reveals no information. Furthermore it is unlikely that the number y reveals a n y useful information because y is superposed by the discrete logarithm of x, y 5 log,x + e . s (mod q) , and the cryptanalyst cannot infer r = logax from x. The scheme is not zero-knowledge because the tripe1 (x,y,e) may be a particular solution of the equation x = aYve (mod p) due to the fact that the choice of e may depend on x.
Minimizing the number of communication bits. We can reduce the number of communication bits for identification. For this A sends in step 2 h(x) (instead of x) and B computes i n step 5 x := aYve (mod p) and checks that h(x) = h(x).
It is not necessary that h is a one-way function because x = a ' (mod p) is already the result of a one-way function. We can take for h(x) the t least significant bits of x. The total number of communication bits for h(x),e,y is 2t + 140 which is less than half that of other schemes. The transmission of e is not necessary, e can be fixed to h(x). Then the pair (y,h(x)) is a signature of the empty message w i t h respect to the following signature scheme.
Protocol for signature generation. To sign message m using the private key s perform the following steps: 1. Preprocessing (see section 3 ) . Pick a random number r E (1. ...,q) and compute x := ar(mod p). 3. Compute y : a r + se (mod q) and output the signature (e,y).
Protocol for signature verification. To verify the signature (e,y) for message m and public key v compute x = a ' V ' (mod p) and check that e = h(x,m) (signature test).
A signature (e,y) is considered to be valid if it withstands the signature test. A signature generated according to the protocol is always valid since With t = 72 and q -2"' the signature (e,y) is 212 bits long.
Efficiency. The work f o r signature generation consists mainly of the preprocessing (see section 3) and the computation of se(mod q) where the numbers s and e are about 140 and t = 72 bits long. The latter multiplication is negligible compared with a modular multiplication in the RSA-scheme.
Signature verification consists mainly of the computation of x = a' ve (mod P) which can be done on the average using 1.5 I + 0.25 t multiplications modulo P where 1 = rlog2ql is the bit length of q. For this let y and e have the binary representations
We compute a v i n advance and we obtain x as follows
3. x:-z .
I
This computation requires a t most I + t -1 + C yi modular multiplications. If half of the bits yi with i 2 t are zero, and ei = y i = 0 holds for one fourth of the i < t , then there are a t most 1.5 I + 0.25 t modular multiplications. (mod p) and can be generated from a random number r by setting x := a' (mod p) and by computing y from the equation
We replace in equation (1) x by the hash value e = h(x,m) . Then we can dispense with the right side m i n equation (1) which we make zero. We further simplify (1) in that we replace the product ry by y-r and p-1 by 9. This transforms (1) into the new equation y = r + es (mod q ) . The new signatures are much shorter.
The choice of the prime q. The prime q must be at least 140 bits long in order to sustain a security level of 2" steps. This is because can be found i n O(&) steps by the baby step giant step method. In order to compute u,v 5 r-&l such that log,(x) = u + r & l v we enumerate the sets Si = log,(x) E (1, ...,q)
(a"(mod p) 10 I u 5 r61) and S2 = {x a -rfilV (mod p) I o 5 v 5 rJsii and we search f o r a common element a" = XQ -rG1v (mod p) .
The choice of the hash function h. We distinguish two types of attacks: a) Given a message m find a signature for m, b) chosen message attack. Sign an unsigned message by using signatures of
In order to thwart the attack a ) the function h(x,m) must be almost uniform with respect to x in the following sense. For every message m, every e E (0,...,2t-1) and random x E Z i the probability probJh(x,m) = el must be near to 2-t. Otherwise, i n case that for fixed m,e the event has nonnegligible probability with respect to random x, the cryptanalyst can compute x := a ' re (mod p) for arbitrary y-values until the equality e = h(x,m) holds. The equality yields a signature (y,e) for message m. If h(x,m) is uniformly distributed with respect to random x then this attack requires about 2' steps. 
Preprocessing the random number exponentiation
We describe an efficient method for preprocessing the random numbers r and x := a' (mod p), that are used for signature generation. This preprocessing mode also applies to other discrete log-cryptosystems such as the schemes by ElGamal (1985) , Beth (1988) and G h t e r (1989).
The smart card stores a collection of k independent random pairs (ri,xi) for i=l, ..., k such that xi = ari (mod p) where the numbers ri are independent random numbers in ( I , ...,q). Initially these pairs can be generated by the KAC.
For every signature/identification the card uses a random combination (r,x) of these pairs and subsequently rejuvenates the collection of pairs by combining randomly selected pairs. We use a random combination (r,x) in order to release minimum information on the pairs (ri,xi) i = I, ..., k . For each signature generation we randomize the pairs (ri,xi) so that no useful information can be collected on the long run. We give an example of a preprocessing algorithm that demonstrates the method. It uses a security parameter d, for all practical purposes d and k can be fairly small integers, for this paper we assume that 6 I d,k .
Preprocessing algorithm
Initiation Load q,xi f o r i-1, ..., k , v := 1 ( v is the round number). 1. Pick random numbers a(0), ..., a(d-3) 
rv := C ra(i) 2' (mod 9 ) , X, := n Xa(i) (mod P) 9
(Below we give a detailed algorithm for this computation. 
The setting a(d)
:-v-1 (mod k) has the effect that step 2 shifts the binary representation of rv-l for d positions to the left and subsequently adds it to r,.
Theorem 4.2 relies on the choice of a(d-1). Lemma 4.3 relies on the choice a(d), and Theorem 4.4 relies on the choice of a(d-2), a(d-1) and a(d).
3. The preprocessing algorithm must not be public. Each smart card can have its own secret algorithm f o r preprocessing. There are many variations of the above technique. It is possible to take for (ra(i),xa(i)) with 0 I i < d-2 the key pair (-S,V).
We describe step 2 of the preprocessing algorithm in detail.
Step 2 can be done using only 2d multiplications modulo p, d additions modulo q and d shifts.
Step 2 of the preprocessing algorithm.
x, := z .
Cryptanalysls of preprocessing
The preprocessing algorithm combines two fundamental principles local randomization and internal randomization. The pairs (r,x) that are used for signatures are locally random i n the sense that every k consecutive pairs are independent, see Theorem 4.2. The random indices a(0), ..., a(d-3) perform a n internal randomization. The principles of local and of internal randomization are complementary and can also be used for the construction of pseudo-random number generators and hash functions.
Notations. We denote the number a(i) of round Y as a(i,u). Let T, be the kxk integer matrix that describes the transformation of the numbers r1, ..., rk in round u of the preprocessing algorithm, i.e. step 2 of round u performs rT := T, r (mod q) where r = (rl, ..., rk) . For j L 0 let r; be the number r after j rounds. The sequence of r-values that is used for signatures is ri,ri, ... *ri . It is an open problem whether the vector (r;lr...,r:k)
is uniformly distributed for all indices 1 s i t < i z ... < ik . We believe that this holds for all but a negligible fraction of the instances for a(i,u) Because of Theorem 4.2 the cryptanalyst can only attack a sequence of more than k consecutive signatures/identifications. The set of the first k+l signatures can be attacked by guessing the numbers a(0), ..., a(d-3) of the first k rounds.
Given these numbers and the first k+l signatures the cryptanalyst can determine the secret key s and the initial numbers rl, ..., rk by solving a system of k+l linear equations modulo q. This attack requires an exhaustive search over k cases.
(d-2)k
Let rnyer be the number r, after u rounds of preprocessing. If q and the for u rounds are fixed then the number myw is a numbers a(0), ..., a(d-3) function of the initial numbers r1, ..., rk which is linear over Z , . distinct instances for the numbers a(0), ..., a(d-3) is quasi-independent of r1, ..., rk . 
T
Now the claim follows from the choice a(d-2,v) = v-1 (mod k) . It follows by a n argument that is similar but more involved than the one for the proof of Lemma 4.3.
0
The fastest attack to the preprocessing algorithm that we are aware of enumerates the linear functions rk+l(rl,...,rk,q,a) that have high probability; the probability space is the set of all vectors a. For the security level 272 i t is necessary that the maximal probability for these linear functions is not much larger than 2-72. In order to break the preprocessing i t is sufficient to guess two functions rk+l(rl, ..., rk,q,a) a n d rk+2 (r2,...,rk+l,q,a) . 
, satisfying yi = eis + 1 t i j rj (mod q) i=l, ..., n .
The searched integers t i j are from the linear transformation (r1 ,..., rk) - We can choose particular primes q and p such that
The particular form simplifies the arithmetic modulo q and modulo p, and requires only 2 6 bytes to store p and q. We are not aware of any disadvantage of this particular form f o r p and q. In total about 800 (635, resp.) bytes EEPROM are sufficient to store p,q,v,e,y and (ri,xi) for i-1, ..., 8 (6, resp.), a is not needed for signature generation. About 192 bytes R A M are necessary to perform modular multiplications with a 512 bit modulus p. The program for signature generation requires less than 500 bytes ROM. lq-2*'01 I 240 , 1~-2~~~l .
Optimization. We give a variant of the preprocessing algorithm that uses only k=6 pairs (ri,Xi) a n d which require on the average 12.76 modular multiplications per round. First let k-6 a n d let (r7,xV) be the pair (-s,v) .
Optimized preprocessing 1. r := r,,-l + r,, (mod q) , x := keep the pair r, x f o r the next signature/identification, u := r + rU-1 (mod q) , z := x -[pick with probability 7-3/29, 7/29, 1/29 resp. 2 , 1 , 0 resp. distinct random numbers a E (1 ,..., 7) .
u := 2u + 1 ra (mod q) , z := z IT x, (mod p)].
3. r,, := u, x,, := z, u := v+l (mod 7), go to 1 for the next round. We can further reduce either the number of pairs (ri.xi) or the number of modular multiplications by inserting write operations into step 2 of the preprocessing. We can a t the end of the inner loop of step 2 decide, based on a coin flip, whether to replace some pair (ra,x.) by (u,z) . This will increase the number of possible transformations per round. However this variant will only be practical if write operations are sufficiently fast. 
